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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ANDY VERCIMAK,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

I

vs.

Case No.
7295

ADAM OSTOICH.
\
Defendant and Appellant,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts is neither fully
accurate nor complete in the following particulars:
Defendant, at page 2 of his brief, quotes the
amended complaint that defendant refused to
adjust and settle all differences and claims of the
plaintiff, except that defendant paid to the plaintiff'\
plaintiff's share of the profits earned from said business to and including the 12th day of February, 1948,
in the sum of $318. 79'1 \Yhereas the allegation is "that
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defendant has refused to adjust and settle all differences and claims of the plaintiff except that defendant paid to the plaintiff the plaintiff's share of the
profits earned to and including the 12th day of
February, 1948, and in addition thereto, the sum of
$318.79 as a partial settlE-ment of plaintiff's claims
CTr. p. 9).
ThC're 1s no evidence to support defendant's
allegation (Appellant's brief p. 3) that plaintiff violated any conditions of the oral agreement and failed
to devote his time and energy to the business. Endeavoring to show misconduct by plaintiff~ defendant
by his o-wn testimony and the testimony of his wife
endeavored to convince the trial court that plaintiff
had been drinking on the job and despite complete
failure to do so is nevertheless still referring to it and
1nakes at least two references to plaintiff's drinking
in defendant's statement of facts (Appellant's brief
pp. 6-7). An examination of defendant's and dE-fendant's 'vife's testimony and the testimony of other
witnesses clearly reveals the falsity of defendant's
contention that plaintiff had been drinking on the
job. Both plaintiff and Dancel Vercimak, his wife,
testified plaintiff did not drink on the job (Tr. pp.
118, 119, 113) and both testified plaintiff did not so
much as have a State of Utah liquor permit (Tr. pp.
T5, 76, 113, 120). Plaintiff also testified that he and
the defendant had never discussed his drinking on
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the job ~ Tr. p. 7:3). Defendant was unable to produce a single independent \Yitness to testify that
plaintiff drank whiskey. Since defendant apparently
relies so much upon the point, one "vonders vvhy he
did not produce \Yitnesses other than himself and his
\Yife to testify regarding his claim of plaintiff's drinking. On cross examination plaintiff \Vas asked by
defendant's attorney if he had ever taken a drink
'vith 1Y1r. Fairbanks, who was one of defendant's
'vitnesses CTr. p. 120), to \'\'hich plaintiff answered,
"'No, sir". Defendant's witness, Mr. Fairbanks, on
direct examination, denied ever having drunk even
so much as a glass of beer with the plaintiff (Tr. p.
165), and on cross examination further stated that
from his observations the plaintiff conducted himself
properly and that he "Vvouldn't say more than he had
seen plaintiff take a drink of beer a couple of times
CTr. p. 166). Josephine Bowen, who frequented the
Horseshoe Inn, testified she had never seen the plaintiff take a drink and that she had never seen him
drunk (Tr. p. 122). Her testimony was not that she
was in the Horseshoe Inn occasionally as stated in defendant's statement of facts (Appellant's brief p. 7),
but that she 'vas in the place ~'almost ever~r night"
(Tr. p. 124).
Defendant states that "plaintiff also suggested going into the grocery business but defendant told him
he would not be interested in that'' (Appellant's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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brief p. I· J. The fact is that defendant suggested a
grocery business and that plaintiff told defendant he
wouldn't be interested (Tr. p. 65).
DefPndant testified the Horseshoe Inn opened for
business December 14, 1947, (Tr. p. 99), and plaintiff alleged in paragraph 4 of his amended complaint
that the business opened to the public December 13,
1947, (Tr. p. 8), and in this connection compare appellant's brief, page 5.
\Yith reference to defendant's claims that he
thought full settlement had been effected (Appellant's brief p. 6) defendant admitted on cross examination that he knew plaintiff claimed more than
his share of the profits and inventory (Tr. p. 107).
Also defendant's tendering two receipts, one for
share of receipts, defendant's Exhibit 2, and the
other for share of stock, defendant's Exhibit 1, and
the circumstances under which they were given
clearly indicated a final settlement was not intended
in connection therewith by either defendant or plaintiff (Tr. pp. 106-107).
Defendant refers to plaintiff's contention that
the business made profits of $750.00 per month and
that plaintiff admitted on cross examination the profit for December was only $380.00 (Appellant's brief
p. 7). Of course, the business opened December 13,
1947, (Tr. p. 8, 99) and the profit for December was,
therefore, for only one-half month's operations.
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At the tin1e of the negotiations for entering in to
the partnership, the plaintiff \Yas gainfully employed
in Rock Springs, 'Vyoming (Tr. pp. 64, 73, 74, 138)
and the plaintiff \Yas not disposed to enter into business vvith the defendant vdthout some assurance of a
reasonable duration (Tr. p. 64). The defendant
requested the plaintiff to enter into the partnership
CTr. p. 64) and to do so the plaintiff necessarily had
to leave his gainful employment in Wyoming and establish his residence in Murray, Utah. The defendant \Yas plaintiff's uncle and naturally plaintiff
placed confidence and trust in him which accounts
for plaintiff not insisting on a \vritten agreement in
the first instance. Plaintiff_'s leaving his employment and expense of moving in order to enter into
the partnership, together vvith plaintiff's initial contribution in labor in preparing the premises (Tr. pp.
136-137) at least offset defendant's claimed $2400.00
investment (Tr. p. 201). Also plaintiff's payment
to defendant of $100.00 per month (Tr. pp. 60, 61,
R1) during the term would have in two years fully
reimbursed defendant for his investment, and of
\Yhich the plaintiff paid for two months totaling
$200.00. The plaintiff loaned to defendant $250.00
or $300.00 initial operating expenses (Tr. pp. 8, 101).
The bE'er license was taken out in plaintiff's name
(Tr. p. 98). The contributions to the partnership
w0re not~ therefore, one-sided in favor of the defendant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

There was considerable competent testimony as
to the value of the business. Plaintiff, Josephine
Bowen, defendant's witness John B. Fairbanks, Samuel L. Tedesco, Reed Van Quill and defendant's witness Harold Leonard all gave testimony relating to
the value of the business.
Defendant makes much over the fact that plaintiff did not have a lease which, of course, is immaterial since the defendant was a partner with the
plaintiff and owned the premises and continued to
operate and to profit after February 12, 1948, from
the value of the business established by the joint
efforts of the partners.

ARGUMENT
1. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES A
CAUSE OF ACTION.
In his amended complaint, plaintiff in orrlinary
and concise language alleges that the partners had
created a business reasonable worth $15,000.00, of
\Vhich the defendant should be required to pay him
one-half thereof, and alleging that the defendant
continued to operate the business and that the rlefendant "has unjustly benefited and accrued to himself and is using for his own purposes the said business of the parties of the reasonable value of $1.J.Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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000.00" (Tr. p. 9). It is clear from a reading of the
complaint that all plaintiff claimed was settlement
for his share of the value of the going business developed from the joint efforts of the parties.
Section 104-7-2 (2) Utah Code Annotated 1943,
provides:
'"The complaint must contain: (2) A
statement of the facts constituting a cause of
action in ordinary and concise language."

Graham v. Street., 109 Utah 460; 166 Pac. (2d)
524 at page 526:
"It is not necessary to designate the type
of action."

Campbellz'. Taylor, 3 lJtah 32:J; 3 Pac. 44;):
'~A complaint need allege no more than
will constitute prima facie a cause of action or
defense."

Geros v. Harries, 65 Utah 227; 236 Pac. 220; 39
A.L.R. 1297:
"In determining sufficiency of allegations
of complaint, one must not have recourse to
only certain parts of complaint, but must determine effect that should be given to complaint when considererl as a whole."
The partnership business as such having a value
which was not divided between the partners, the
plaintiff is entitled to his proportionate share in cash.
(See Section 69-1-35 ( 1) lJtah Code Annotated
1q41.)
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THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS FINDING
THAT THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
WAS BREACHED BY THE DEFENDANT.

Appellant in his brief throughout makes constant reference to the proposed written partnership
agreement which the plaintiff had his attorney prepare and· present to the defendant for signing but
\'vhich the defendant would not sign, discuss or make
any recommendations (Tr. p. 78). Why didn't the
defendant sign the agreement? Was it because it
did not provide for a term of 5 years? It is apparent
that defendant did not, after the business had commenced operations and its value vvas apparent, intend to sign any vvritten agreement of partnership.
It is fair to say that the defendant thought he savv an
opportunity to take the value of the business for
himself ·without having to share vvith the plaintiff
and refused to enter into a written agreement (Tr.
p. 6 7), or to continue in partnership with plaintiff
CTr. pp. 71-72).
Even though no definite time for the partnership term vvas agreed upon, a reasonable time should
be implied and what would constitute a reasonable
time vvould depend upon all the circumstances of the
particular case. In this connection and as before discussed in plaintiff's and appellant's statement of facts
herein. plaintiff vvas induced by defendant in order
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to enter the partnership to leave gainful ernployment
in \Vyoming, contribute at least five weeks labor in
preparing the premises before opening to the public,
to bear the expense of Inoving from Wyoming to
Utah, and the be('r license was secured in the plaintiff's name. Certainly these circumstances would
not imply a t\YO months operation period for the
partnership term, nor justify defendant's refusal to
continue the partnership or to permit plaintiff on the
premises for the purpose of operating the partnership
at the end of t"vo n1onths operations, that is, on February 12, 1948, and the defendant, therefore, in refusing under the circumstances to go on with the
partnership, breached the partnership agreement as
alleged in plaintiff's complaint.
For the purpose_ of argument and illustration,
assurnc that there had been no breach of partnership
agreement by the defendant and that the partnership had continued to function and operate for the
extended term of say five years and that at the end
of five ) e3rs the value of the then going busi,~ess \Vas
reasonably \vorth $10,000.00. Would the defendant
have been entitled to keep the value of the business
and to continue operating the same without compensating plaintiff for his share as a partner thereof?

3. TI-TERE WAS NOT A COMPLETE SETTLEMENT AND SATISFACTION BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.
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Defendant vYcll knew the plaintiff claimed n1ore
than plaintiff's share of inventory and profits to February 12, 1948, as plaintiff's share of the business and
on cross examination admitted as much (Tr. p. 107).
Plaintiff's case is based on his position there was not
a complete settlement and he so testified.
Obviously the fact that defendant issued two
receipts rather than one (Tr. pp. 106-107) indicates
tha~ defendant was not intending a full settlement
by either receipt, otherwise he would have issued
but one receipt.

4. TJ-IERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS TO
THE VALUE OF AND GOOD WILL OF
TI-IE BUSINESS.
The defendant advised the plaintiff that the
business \Yas worth $10,000.00 more than when
opened (Tr. p. 67). Plaintiff testified as to the net
profits the business was realizing and which averaged over the tvvo months operations, December 13,
1947, to February 12, 194·8, in excess of $750.00 per
month (Tr. p. 147). The plaintiff had also worked
for five vveeks from eight to tvvelve hours per day
putting the premises in condition prior to opening
business CTr. p. 137).
Josephine Bowen testified that she had been in
th(' Horseshoe Inn almost every night during the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

period of the partnership (Tr. p. 12-1,), that there
\Yere about t\Yenty-five stools in the establishment
and the place \Yas full (Tr. p. 124). and that customers were coming and going CTr. p. 127). She
\Yas familiar \Yith the operations of beer taverns
since she worked for her uncle, Jack's Place, located
a fe\Y doors to the south of I-Iorseshoe Inn (Tr. pp.
121, 12·)).
Mary Sa\Yaya~ who O\'vned and operated Sawaya Inn, considered a draft beer license valuable
(Tr. p. 156). The draft beer license was applied for
and issued in plaintiff's name (Tr. p. 98).
John B. Fairbanks, defendant's '''itness, testified
the customers were heavy in the Horseshoe Inn on
Ne\Y Year's Eve (Tr. p. 164).
Reed Van Quill, bar tender by occupation, testified he had been in the Horseshoe Inn between December 12, 1947, and February 12, 1948, had observed the business and that the place was busy (Tr.
p. 167). He further testified that beginning June 5,
1948, to September 4, 1948., he vvas employed in the
Horseshoe Inn as bar tender for the defendant and
that it "'as his observation that the business was
about the same during his employment as bet"'een
December 12, 1947, and February 12, 1948 (Tr. pp.
169-172)~ and that he was paid wages and commissions totaling $100.00 per \'veek by the defendant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

His wages were but $10.00 per shift and his commissions made up the balance (Tr. p. 170), which reflects that the volume of business was considerable.
It was no wonder that the defendant wanted to dissolve partnership and keep all the profits himself
considering the business could afford to pay the bar
tender $100.00 per week. Mr. Van Quill further
testified the gross receipts were $75.00 per day (Tr.
p. 174) and that the net profit was about $350.00
per week (Tr. p. 175) and throughout his testimony
went into detail as to the source of the business receipts. Among other items sold, he testified that an
average of tvvo kegs of beer were sold per day and
_that Mr. Ostoich, defendant, had shown him set up
for that quantity (Tr. p. 180).
Samuel L. Tedesco, real estate salesman for
Brockbank Realty and at one time manager of four
beer parlors, testified the value of the going business
was in his opinion in the sum of $6500.00 (Tr. p.
188).
1-Iarold Leonard, defendant's expert on values,
testified after laying a foundation for his opinion
that the value of the good will of the business alone
was in the sum of $1,000.00 (Tr. p. 206).
As before mentioned, there is no advantage to
defendant in his contention that plaintiff di'd not own
a lease,. since defendant owned the premises anrl
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there is no dispute but that th(' defendant continued
to operate the identical business at the same location
and under the name of Horseshoe Inn after February
12~ 1948, and presumabl)· is still doing so and profiting from plaintiff's undistributed interest th('rein.
·). THE COURT'S FINDING NlJMBER 4 IS
DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AND SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The trial court \Yas entitled to take into consideration all of the testimony on value of the business and good ·will, \vhich testimony has been heretofore reviewed in finding what the value was and
in this connection, there 'vas substantial evidence on
value as appears from the testimony of the witnesses
heretofore sumn1arized. All that is required to sustain the court's finding is that it be sustained by substantial evidence. Dee v. San Pedro L.A. & S.L.R.
Co., 50 Utah 77; 167 Pac. 246, at page 252. It is
true that not one witness testified that the value of
the business as such, exclusive of furniture and fixtures, etc., was in the exact sum of $1600.00, but
some testified the value was more than that sum
and defendant's own expert, :Harold Leonard, testified it was in the sum of $1000.00.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

WENDELL C. DAY
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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